Regulation and public policies

  • Niveau d'étude

    BAC +5

  • ECTS

    4,5 crédits

  • Composante

    Institut de Préparation à l'Administration Générale

  • Volume horaire

    24h

  • Période de l'année

    Enseignement neuvième semestre

Objectifs

▪ Identify and critically appraise the main economic rationales for state regulation — market failures, externalities, information asymmetries, and market power — and evaluate their limits

▪ Situate efficiency-based justifications alongside deontological and distributional approaches to regulation, drawing on key contributions by Rawls, Nozick, and others

▪ Compare command-and-control strategies with economic-incentive instruments (taxes, tradeable permits), and assess emerging alternatives including nudges, mandated disclosure, self-regulation, and platform governance

. Apply public choice theory — including Stigler's capture theory, Olson's logic of collective action, and logrolling — to explain observed departures from efficient regulation

▪ Analyse real-world regulatory episodes (environmental policy, taxi/ride-sharing markets, competition law) using the analytical tools developed in the course

▪ Evaluate social choice procedures and Arrow's impossibility theorem as constraints on the idea of a democratic "general interest"

▪ Produce well-reasoned, evidence-based regulatory assessments that acknowledge trade-offs between efficiency, fairness, enforceability, and political feasibility

Lire plus

Évaluation

Mode dérogatoire session 1 : 

take home project

Session 2 : oral exam

Lire plus

Heures d'enseignement

  • CMCM24h

Bibliographie

Core Textbooks

▪ Buchanan, J. & Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent. University of Michigan Press.

▪ Coase, R. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1–44.

▪ Kaplow, L. & Shavell, S. (1994). Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income. Journal of Legal Studies, 23(2), 667–681.

▪ Landes, E. & Posner, R. (1978). The Economics of the Baby Shortage. Journal of Legal Studies, 7(2), 323–348.

▪ Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press.

▪ Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a More General Theory of Regulation. Journal of Law and Economics, 19(2), 211–240.

▪ Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.

▪ Stigler, G. (1971). The Theory of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2(1), 3–21.

▪ Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Basic Books.

Complementary Readings

▪ Hayek, F.A. (1945). The Use of Knowledge in Society. American Economic Review, 35(4), 519–530.

▪ Jaffe, A., Newell, R. & Stavins, R. (2002). Environmental Policy and Technological Change. Environmental and Resource Economics, 22(1–2), 41–70.

▪ Lipsey, R. & Lancaster, K. (1956). The General Theory of Second Best. Review of Economic Studies, 24(1), 11–32.

▪ Maloney, M. & McCormick, R. (1982). A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation. Journal of Law and Economics, 25(1), 99–123.

▪ Hart, H.L.A. (1961). The Concept of Law. Oxford University Press [Chapter VII].

▪ Sowell, T. (1980). Knowledge and Decisions. Basic Books [Chapter 2].

Lire plus