Law and economics

  • Niveau d'étude

    BAC +5

  • ECTS

    3 crédits

  • Composante

    Institut de Préparation à l'Administration Générale

  • Volume horaire

    24h

  • Période de l'année

    Enseignement dixième semestre

Description

This course introduces students to the economic analysis of law

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Objectifs

▪ Explain the foundational assumptions of the law-and-economics approach — rationality, incentives, efficiency, and opportunity cost — and apply them to concrete legal problems

▪ State the Coase theorem precisely and deploy it to analyse externality disputes, explain why the theorem's conditions are rarely met, and derive implications for optimal legal rules under positive transaction costs

▪ Analyse property rights as bundles of entitlements, compare property-rule, liability-rule, and inalienability protection, and evaluate when each form of protection is efficient

▪ Apply the economic theory of contract law — including incomplete contracts, default rules, expectation and reliance damages, and the efficient-breach debate — to assess the welfare effects of contract doctrines

▪ Use the unilateral and bilateral care models of tort law to derive optimal liability rules (negligence, strict liability, contributory negligence) and evaluate their efficiency under different factual configurations

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Évaluation

mcq & take home exam

Mode dérogatoire session 1 : oral

Session 2 : oral

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Heures d'enseignement

  • CMCM24h

Bibliographie

Core Textbooks

▪ Cooter, R. & Ulen, T. (2016). Law and Economics. 6th ed. Pearson. [Primary textbook — covers lectures 1–6 and 13]

▪ Posner, R.A. (2014). Economic Analysis of Law. 9th ed. Wolters Kluwer. [Comprehensive reference for all parts of the course]

▪ Shavell, S. (2004). Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law. Harvard University Press. [Advanced reference for private law lectures]

▪ Viscusi, W.K., Harrington, J. & Sappington, D. (2018). Economics of Regulation and Antitrust. 5th ed. MIT Press. [Lectures 12–13]

Foundational Articles

▪ Calabresi, G. & Melamed, A.D. (1972). Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral. Harvard Law Review, 85(6), 1089–1128.

▪ Coase, R.H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1–44.

▪ Demsetz, H. (1967). Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review, 57(2), 347–359.

▪ Goldsmith, J. & Posner, E. (1999). A Theory of Customary International Law. University of Chicago Law Review, 66(4), 1113–1177.

▪ Hand, L. (1947). United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). [The Hand formula]

▪ Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press. [Lecture 8]

▪ Stigler, G. (1971). The Theory of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2(1), 3–21.

▪ Stigler, G. (1964). A Theory of Oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), 44–61.

Political Economy & Development

▪ Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J.A. (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. Crown Business.

▪ Arrow, K. (1951). Social Choice and Individual Values. Yale University Press.

▪ Buchanan, J. & Tullock, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consent. University of Michigan Press.

▪ North, D.C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press.

▪ Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.

Competition Law

▪ Bork, R.H. (1978). The Antitrust Paradox. Basic Books.

▪ Tirole, J. (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press.

▪ European Commission (2004). Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty. OJ C 101/97.

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